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PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES-THE 1999 PACIFIC
SALMON AGREEMENT
Sims G. Weymuller
t
Abstract: The United States and Canada have found a solution to their century
long "salmon war" over how many salmon can be taken by each side's fishing fleets from
the once-bountiful Pacific salmon runs. Each country felt entitled to an "equitable"
portion of the salmon, but no agreed means existed to calculate the shares. Canada felt
that the prodigious U.S. fleet often caught more than its share. Substantial peace first
came under the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, but dwindling salmon populations, the
expiration of the original management regimes, and flaws in those regimes threatened to
doom the 1985 Treaty by the mid-1990s. The lack of harvest agreements left each
country scrambling for the fish, putting unsustainable pressure on an already delicate
resource. After half a decade of infighting and argument, Canada and the United States
signed a new agreement under the treaty in 1999. On the surface, the genius of the new
Agreement lies in the new "Abundance Based Management" scheme and the multi-
million dollar Endowment Funds earmarked for conservation. The flexible, resource-
based management programs considered the yearly strength of the salmon runs before
and during the harvest season. These new regimes, and the 1999 Agreement as a whole,
were subject to review under the Endangered Species Act, completed by NMFS in 1999.
The Endowment Funds provided a financial base to undertake substantial conservation
initiatives. With the understanding that an imperfect agreement was better than no
agreement, the Canadians effectively set aside their longstanding equity demands to
achieve consensus. As part of the overall compromise, the United States agreed to fully
finance the Endowment Funds for a total of (U.S.) $140 million. The sea change in
Canadian negotiation posture reflected a renewed emphasis on resource conservation and
a willingness to pioneer new avenues for success.
1. INTRODUCTION
Pacific salmon are both an inspiration and a staple to the people across
the Northern Pacific Rim. The past bounty of this species was an integral
element of ecosystems that supported the indigenous tribes of the Pacific
Northwest for over nine thousand years.' For local Native Americans,
salmon were a source of food, pride, recreation, and even spirituality.2  The
arrival of Western civilization to this region brought about drastic reductions
in salmon populations. As salmon populations have dwindled, competition
t The author is grateful to Professor William H. Rodgers, Larry Rutter, Paul Sprout, Daniel
Huppert, and to the terrific efforts of the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal Editorial Staff. The author
also gives thanks to his family for a lifetime of love and support. Finally, the author thanks Stacy Connole,
without whose boundless encouragement this project would have remained in the depths of the Pacific.
JIM LACHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS 28 (1999).
2 Id. at 1-13.
I d. at 52-113.
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for the remaining salmon has increased.4 In particular, the United States and
Canada fish aggressively for Pacific salmon.5 Over the last century the two
countries have competed and compromised over the harvest and
management of these fish.6
The essential issue between Canada and the United States stems from
the remarkable migratory life cycle of the Pacific salmon. Originating in the
interior streams of the coastal regions of Canada and the United States, all
five species of Pacific salmon are anadromous.7 Anadromous species hatch
in freshwater rivers and streams, migrate downstream into estuaries and
ultimately into the ocean.8  Upon maturation, salmon journey home
hundreds of miles to their native stream to spawn and complete their life
cycle. 9 Between birth and death, Pacific salmon pay little heed to political
boundaries, migrating through territorial waters of neighboring nations.'0 As
a result, commercial and recreational fishers often catch fish that are
returning to the waters of neighboring countries. This practice has caused
competition and bitter argument between the United States and Canada."
The first comprehensive agreement between the United States and
Canada regarding the commercial salmon harvest was the Pacific Salmon
Treaty of 1985 ("1985 Treaty"). 12 The 1985 Treaty was successful in the
short term, but the Treaty required yearly negotiations 3 that began to fail in
the mid 1990s. The provisions on the number of fish that were hatched in
the streams of one nation that could later be harvested by the other nation
14
presented the largest stumbling block for the negotiation process. Several
4 Karol de Zwager Brown, Truce in the Salmon War: Alternatives for the Pacific Salmon Treaty, 74
WASH. L. REV. 605, 622 (1999).
5 TROUT UNLIMITED & TROUT UNLIMITED CANADA, RESOLVING THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY
STALEMATE 1 (1999).
6 Id. at2.
7 LACHATOWICH, supra note 1, at 9.
8 Backgrounder, A History of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Canada, http://www.ncr.dfo.ca/COMMUNIC/backgrou/1999/hq29(113)_e.htm.
LACHATOWICH, supra note 1, at 11. Due to this cycle, the condition of the streams in which the
salmon spawn is an important determinant of their survival. Blockage, pollution, biological modification,
or elimination of streams or rivers can prevent salmon from completing their life cycle, leading to declines
in population. Id. at 130-36.
1o Daniel D. Huppert, Why the Pacific Salmon Treaty Failed to End the Salmon War, New
Directions in Marine Affairs (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Marine Affairs ed.), Jan. 1996, at 2.
I /d.
12 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11091 (entered into force Mar. 18,
1985), available at 1985 WL 167273 [hereinafter 1985 Treaty].
" ld. art. IV.
14 Id.
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failed negotiations ensued until Canada and the United States reached an
agreement in June 1999.15
The 1999 Pacific Salmon Agreement ("1999 Agreement") was the
harbinger of seemingly mended fences between Canada and the United
States. A new harvest management scheme, designed to be sensitive to
variations in salmon populations, focused on conservation of the Pacific
salmon.1 6 Two large funds 17 were created to carry out the goals of the 1999
Agreement.18  The 1999 Agreement also provided for a renewed
commitment to scientific cooperation and a joint commitment by both
nations to protect and restore salmon habitat.' 9
In addition to the terms of the 1999 Agreement itself, Diplomatic
Notes ("Notes") exchanged at the signing required an Endangered Species
Act review of the 1999 Agreement, a review that was limited in scope.
This National Marine Fisheries Service completed the review within the
time frame set out in the Notes. The review covered only the northern
fisheries, leaving subsequent review of the southern fisheries for a later
date.2'
Nevertheless, the 1999 Agreement reflects a significant change in the
relationship between the two nations regarding their mutual salmon harvest
policy. In particular, the Canadian government, in an arguably visionary
step, apparently set aside its claim to equity in an effort to put the
conservation of the resource first. This change of perspective allowed
compromise on an historically intractable issue.
This Comment examines the 1999 Agreement between Canada and
the United States. Part II outlines the history of agreement and conflict
between Canada and the United States over Pacific salmon management.
Part III considers the structure, operation, demise, and aftermath of the 1985
" Agreement Relating to and Amending Annexes I and IV of the Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon
of January 28, 1985, with attachments, June 30, 1999, U.S.-Can., State Dept. No. 99-97, available at 2000
WL 668151 [hereinafter 1999 Agreement]. The 1999 Agreement was an agreement amending and
extending the original 1985 Treaty.
16 id.
" These funds were the Northern Boundary and Transboundary Rivers Restoration and
Enhancement Fund ("Northern Fund") and the Southern Boundary Restoration and Enhancement Fund
("Southern Fund") (Collectively, "the Funds"). Id. Annex IV, attachment C.
18 Id.
19 Id. Annex IV, attachments D, E.
20 Id. Diplomatic Notes. The Diplomatic Notes were exchanged between Canada and the United
States at the signing of the 1999 Agreement. For an explanation of their significance and binding nature,
see infra Part V.C.
2 1 Biological Opinion, National Marine Fisheries Service, Approval of the Pacific Salmon Treaty by
the U.S. Department of State and Management of the Southeast Alaska Salmon Fisheries Subject to the
Pacific Salmon Treaty (Nov. 18, 1999), at 7 [hereinafter Biological Opinion].
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Treaty. Part IV examines the content, structure, and requirements of the
1999 Agreement. Part V analyzes the negotiation process of the 1999
Agreement, its resulting strengths and weaknesses, as well as the U.S.
Endangered Species Act review. Part VI concludes that a shift in Canadian
negotiation posture broke the seemingly intractable stalemate and provided
the basis for a final agreement balancing the needs of the nations, their
commercial fleets and the Pacific salmon.
II. THE HISTORY OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT OVER PACIFIC
SALMON
The migratory habits of the Pacific salmon are the main source of the
dispute between Canada and the United States. Salmon migrate from their
native rivers to the Ocean commons, where they are "intercepted" by fishers
from other nations. The United States and Canada have long maintained that
they are entitled to the fish from their waters. But that division has rarely
been easy or accurate, causing a century of conflict over the harvest of
Pacific salmon.
A. Biological Factors Contributing to the Dispute
The management of such a wide-ranging migratory species as the
Pacific salmon has proven difficult.22 The primary goal of salmon fisheries
management is to maintain a healthy and sustainable population to ensure a
sustained harvest for all fisheries.23 This goal is accomplished by ensuring
that an ample amount of salmon are allowed to "escape" the commercial24
fisheries and return to their streams of origin to spawn. Seemingly infinite
variables complicate salmon management, including: hatching rates and
25 26juvenile survival, ocean conditions and events, prey populations,
spawning rates,27 and freshwater river flows. 28 Hydroelectric dams on the
22 Huppert, supra note 10, at 2.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Hatching rates and juvenile survival refer to the number of salmon that are hatched as smolts in
the freshwater environment versus the number that are able to negotiate their way through the river system,
beyond the estuaries and to the ocean. Id.
26 Ocean upwellings and large climactic episodes such as El Nifio and La Nifia create great
disturbances in the meta-level nutrient patterns in the ocean. These variations can leave successfully
migrated salmon without an abundant food supply once they reach the ocean. Id.
27 Spawning rates measure the amount of salmon that return to their stream of origin to spawn as
compared to the amount of salmon that originally migrated to sea. Id. Harvesting managers often refer to
the quantity of salmon that are not harvested and begin their journey to the stream of origin as an
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Columbia River and its tributaries,29 substantial habitat degradation, and
industrial and agricultural pollution further pressure the species and
management's ability to predict and protect salmon stocks.3° In addition, the
competing needs of various stakeholders such as streamside industrial
facilities, commercial fishers, farmers, power generators, Native Americans,
sport fishers, and environmental groups complicate management.
The migratory habits of the Pacific salmon are the main source of the
dispute between Canada and the United States.31 As salmon emerge from
their rivers of origin into the Pacific Ocean and move up and down the
coastline, some portion of the migrating fish are inevitably caught by the
32fishers of the other country. These "interceptions" are at the root of the
salmon problem between the United States and Canada, two otherwise non-
confrontational nations. 33 As summarized by Ray Suarez of National Public
Radio News, "[t]here's no maple leaf on the side of salmon meant to be
caught by a Canadian vessel, no stars and stripes on a Sockeye. 34  In a
recent report to the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United
States, special appointees David Strangway (Canada) and William
Ruckelshaus (United States) concluded, "the crux of the dispute between
Canada and the [United States] is the age old practice of fishers catching fish
where they find them, regardless of the river where the fish originate."
3
"escapement" value. Id. However, since escapement addresses the number of fish that begin the journey
upstream and spawning rates refer to the number that actually make it upriver to spawn, the two are usually
different values. Id.
28 De-watered rivers harm salmon in numerous ways. Salmon require full, cold, and fast moving
water for their habitat. Id. Water withdrawals reduce these factors in a river exposing salmon to a myriad
of problems, including: over heating, prey exposure, and perhaps most importantly the process of drying
out the salmon "redds" (spawning grounds or gravel where the eggs incubate). Id. Reduction in water
flows (also termed "in stream flows") can negatively affect hatching rates, juvenile survival, and spawning
rates. Id.
29 Debate rages over the actual effects of the thirty-eight dams on the Columbia River system on
salmon populations. Many critics assert that the migrating fish are lost through mismanaged river flows
through dams, gas supersaturation (or "gas bubble disease"), exhaustion, exposure to prey, and more. The
effect of hydroelectric dams are beyond the scope of this paper, but for a complete discussion of the roots
and evolution of the salmon crisis in the Pacific Northwest, see LACHATOWICH, supra note 1.
30 See LACHATOWICH, supra note 1.
31 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 606.
32 Huppert, supra note 10, at 5.
33 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 606.
34 Ray Suarez, Talk of the Nation: Restoring Salmon Fisheries in the Pacific Northwest, Canada and
Alaska and the US.-Canadian Agreement over Catches in Coastal Waters (NPR News Radio Broadcast,
June 8, 1999).
35 DAVID W. STRANGWAY & WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS, PACIFIC SALMON REPORT TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF CANADA AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1998).
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When fishers intercept salmon from other nations, their practice
comes into conflict with the "state of origin" principle.36  This principle of
environmental law was codified in the United Nations Third Law of the Sea
Convention in 1982. While neither Canada nor the United States are parties
to this Convention, both generally accept the provisions on anadromous
species as international law.37 The "state of origin" principle maintains that
the nation where a migratory species originates has the primary interest
3 8
and the authority to manage the fish that spawn in their rivers, both within
their 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ")39 and on the high seas.40
This interest extends to fish that migrate beyond their jurisdiction and into or
through the jurisdiction of another country.4 1  However, determining the
42
national origin of a salmon is difficult, even in a laboratory. It is especially
challenging when harvesting them by the thousands.43  As Pacific salmon
stocks declined over the last century, Canadian and U.S. commercial
fisheries, and thus the two nations, came into conflict.
4 4
B. Canada-U.S. Fisheries Relations Prior to the 1985 Treaty
Over the course of the last century, Canada and the United States have
at various times cooperated, conflicted, threatened, and agreed about the
36 Ted L. McDorman, Symposium: A Canadian View of the Canada-United States Pacific Salmon
Treaty: The International Legal Context, 6 WILLAMETTE J. INTL L. & DISPUTE RES. 79, 81 (1988).
37 McDorman, supra note 36, at 80; U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 1261.
38 The extent to which the language "primary interest" creates a proprietary right in one nation to
harvest, to the exclusion of vessels of another nationality, is unclear. Associate Professor of Law, Ted L.
McDorman, (University of Victoria, B.C. Canada), concluded that "the best view of this issue is that while
the state of origin may have a proprietary interest in salmon in the waters of the neighboring state, that
proprietary interest does not inhibit the jurisdiction of the neighboring state regarding that salmon." Id. at
82. Both the United States and Canada have supported language that would create stronger rights in
salmon that come from their rivers. Id. However, McDorman concluded that in spite of strong language,
"it is my view that pursuant to the Law of the Sea Convention, once salmon have left the waters of the state
of origin and entered the waters of a neighboring state, that neighboring state can treat that salmon as its
own." Id. at 85.
39 The Convention established these EEZs, which give coastal states the exclusive right to manage
fisheries within the 200-mile mark off of their coasts. 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 37, art. 57.
40 The "high seas" are the rest of the ocean waters outside the 200-mile EEZs. de Zwager Brown,
supra note 4, at 616-17.
41 Id.
42 id.
43 The most successful efforts at determining the river of origin in large harvests are usually
accomplished by tagging juvenile fish in their river and then counting those tags at harvest. Id. The
counted tags are used as indicators and the actual percentage is estimated based on those numbers. Id.
44 TROUT UNLIMITED & TROUT UNLIMITED CANADA, supra note 5, at 2.
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management of Pacific salmon.45  Various agreements, both bilateral and
multilateral,46 have shaped the relationship between the two nations.47
By the 1970s, stocks of Chinook and Coho salmon began to decline to
dangerously low levels and each country blamed the other for over-
harvesting.48 Between 1970 and the signing of the 1985 Treaty, tension and
animosity grew between the two nations.49  Over-harvesting, by both
Canadian and U.S. fishers, placed increasing stress on salmon populations.50
Hydroelectric dams, habitat destruction, reduced river flows, and other
freshwater environmental problems further contributed to the decline in
populations.5 '
As the size of salmon returns diminished, tensions increased and the
"salmon wars" began in earnest.52 Fishing fleets began to directly compete
with each other with the intent of catching as many fish as possible and
ensuring that other fleet did not.53  The fierce harvesting and this "zero
sum" 54 approach resulted in the rapid deterioration of salmon runs and the
relationship between the two nations.5 5 Although there was clearly a need
for comprehensive international fisheries management, the method and
model for that management were not as clear.
In the 1970s, two key U.S. lawsuits further complicated negotiations
by enforcing tribal treaty rights that drastically increased the U.S. Native
American stake in the overall salmon harvest and the management of the
fishery. 56  The "Boldt Decision ' 57 reaffirmed the right of U.S. Native
45 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 612.
4 These agreements include the Convention for Protection, Preservation and Extension of the
Sockeye Salmon Fisheries of the Fraser River System (United States and Canada, re-negotiated and ratified
in 1937); International North Pacific Fishery Convention (United States, Japan and Canada, 1953); "Surf
Line Agreement" (United States and Canada, 1957); and U.N. Law of the Sea Convention (U.N., 1982). de
Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 613-18.
See generally McDorman, supra note 36.
48 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 623.
49 Id.
50 Huppert, supra note 10, at 4.
51 Jason Dunn, The 1999 Pacific Salmon Treaty Agreement, 1999 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y
164, 165 (1999).
52 The series of disagreements between the United States and Canada over salmon management
issues became popularly known as the "salmon wars." de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 612.
"3 Id. at 660.
54 The term "zero sum" refers to the capture theory with a goal of victory over one's opponent versus
a goal of simply sustaining oneself. Here, this term means that each fleet would intentionally attempt to
undercut the other fleet, rather than just focusing on catching their limits.
5 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 625.
56 Id. at 619.
57 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974). Another case also involved a
number of similarly worded treaties signed in the mid-1880s between the U.S. government and several
Native American tribes in Washington State. See United States v. Washington, 626 F. Supp 1405 (W.D.
Wash. 1985). The treaties were a result of efforts by Governor Isaac Stevens on behalf of the United States
MAY 2001
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
American Tribes to fish in their "usual and accustomed" places and to
"equally share" the overall harvest. 58  The "Baldridge Stipulation," 59 a
settlement between twenty-four treaty tribes,60 the Federal Government,
Alaska, Oregon and Washington, established that Alaskan interceptions of
Pacific Northwest salmon must be allocated and included in the non-tribal
share of the total harvest.6 ' By mandating such an inclusive harvest scheme,
the Baldridge stipulation cleared the way for the United States to negotiate
an agreement with Canada.
62
III. THE 1985 PACIFIC SALMON TREATY AND ITS AFTERMATH
Canada and the United States successfully concluded several years of
negotiations and signed the Pacific Salmon Treaty in January of 1985. The
1985 Treaty emphasized conservation of the species, created a scheme of
guide sharing between the nations, and established a bilateral commission to
oversee its operation. The 1985 Treaty had some success, but ultimately
expired in the mid-1990s, leaving the nations without an agreement, the
fishers without harvest limits, and the salmon in peril.
A. The Terms of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty
On January 28, 1985, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and
U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed the Fisheries Pacific Salmon Treaty.63
Annex IV of the Treaty contains six distinct chapters addressing
management arrangements for the key fisheries within the treaty area: (1)
Trans-boundary Rivers; 64 (2) Northern British Columbia and Southeastern
Alaska; (3) Chinook Salmon; (4) Fraser River Sockeye and Pink Salmon;
65
to persuade the tribes to relinquish their land. See id. The language of a number of the treaties extended
powerful fishing rights to many of the tribes. See id.
58 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 620. Under the Boldt decision, "equally share" was interpreted
to mean that Native Americans were entitled to fifty percent of the overall harvest. Washington, 384 F.
Supp. at 312.
5' Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldridge, 605 F. Supp. 833 (W.D.
Wash. 1985).
60 See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 312.
61 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 622.
62 Joy A. Yanagida, The Pacific Salmon Treaty, 81 AM SOC. INT'L L. 577, 584 (1987).
63 1985 Treaty, supra note 12.
64 Trans-boundary rivers originate in Canada and flow through the United States before reaching the
Pacific ocean. This largely happens in Southeast Alaska as the "panhandle" juts down the coast in front of
mainland Canada.
65 The Fraser River is one of the largest Canadian salmon rivers. Its headwaters are hundreds of
miles inland and its mouth is near Vancouver, B.C.
VOL. 10 No. 3
1999 PACIFIC SALMON AGREEMENT
(5) Coho Salmon; and (6) Southern British Columbia and Washington Chum
Fisheries.
66
The 1985 Treaty established temporary management regimes with
"fixed ceilings" in place for the majority of the fisheries in the six
categories.67 Each fixed ceiling set a harvest limit in each category for each
nation prior to the season. 68 This pre-set system was insensitive to natural
fluctuation in salmon returns. 69 The 1985 Treaty limited the time frame of
the management regimes, 70 the longest of which was the eight-year Fraser
River regime.
71
The 1985 Treaty also established two guiding principles for fisheries
management between the nations. First, the "conservation principle
'7 2
ensured that fisheries management of each country would "prevent
overfishing and provide for optimum production., 73  Second, the "equity
principle" 4 ensured that management would "provide for each party to
receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its
waters." 75 These principles were seen as interdependent, the first ensuring
an abundance of the resource and the second allocating it.
76
The "equity principle" was a controversial element of the 1985
Treaty.77 According to Professor McDorman, 78 U.S. officials "consistently
opposed" this concept during the negotiations of the 1985 Treaty.
McDorman postulated that the principle did not prohibit the harvest of
salmon from neighboring countries. 80 Rather, it established a mechanism to
give the nation of origin the economic benefits it loses through the
66 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, Annex IV, chs. 1-5. Some categories, including the Fraser River
Sockeye and Pink fisheries, were managed for abundance. Id.67Id.
68 Id. These limits are set by the Pacific Salmon Commission. See infra Part IV.
69 Shifting from the fixed ceiling regime to "Abundance Based Management Regimes" is a major
facet of the 1999 Agreement and is discussed in greater detail infra Part IV.
70 The 1999 Agreement substituted the short-term regimes with ten- and twelve-year regimes to
increase the stability of the agreement. 1999 Agreement, supra note 15; see discussion infra Part IV.
71 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, Annex IV, chs. i-5.
72 Huppert, supra note 10, at 2.
73 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, art. III, para. l(a).
74 Huppert, supra note 10, at 2.
75 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, art. III, para. l(b). Article III also expressly states that "[i]n fulfilling
their obligations pursuant to paragraph 1, the Parties shall take into account: (a) the desirability in most
cases of reducing interceptions . . . " Id. art. III, para. 3(a). The failure to fully observe this rule in the
years to come would ultimately be the crux of the general conflict between the two nations. Huppert, supra
note 10, at 2.
76 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 627.
77 McDorman, supra note 36, at 89.
78 id.
79 Id.
s Id.
MAY 2001
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
interceptions.8' McDorman concluded that the two nations did not agree to
the equity principle because of any allegiance to the Convention on the Law
of the Sea, but simply because each had long maintained publicly that the
nation of origin deserves the fish.82
To carry out its provisions, the 1985 Treaty established the Pacific
Salmon Commission ("PSC").83  The PSC has a total of eight
Commissioners that are split into two sections, each section containing four
Commissioners that were appointed from each nation.84 The duty of the
PSC is to oversee implementation of the management regimes and principles
established in the 1985 Treaty.85 However, the terms of the 1985 Treaty
mandated that all of the PSC sections representing both nations approve any
decision by the PSC.8 6 While this consensus process sought to ensure that
each decision was equitable to both nations, it also made the PSC less
efficient and effective than it otherwise might have been.87
To support the PSC with information and expertise, Annex I of the
1985 Treaty created three panels that report to the PSC.88 The panels were
divided geographically into the Southern Panel, the Fraser River Panel, and
the Northern Panel.89 The Fraser River Panel was the only panel vested with
management authority. 90 That authority extended beyond the Fraser River,
from the waters around Vancouver Island (south) to the waters of Puget
Sound. 91 Several technical committees provided support to the panels and
the Commission.
92
B. Operation and Aftermath of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty
1. Operation of the 1985 Treaty
Both Canada and the United States initially considered the 1985
Treaty a success. It succeeded in rebuilding the size of the Fraser River and
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, art. II, para. 1.
8 Id. art. II, para. 3. Each section is funded by its respective nation. Id. art. II, para. 11.
85 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 631.
86 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, art. II, para. 6.
87 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 631.
88 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, Annex I.
89 Id.
90 The Fraser River Panel regulates the fisheries for Fraser River Pink and Sockeye salmon. Trout
Unlimited & Trout Unlimited Canada, supra note 5, at 3.
91 The authority also includes the waters surrounding Whidbey and Fidalgo Islands in the Puget
Sound. 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, Annex II, para. 2.
92 Trout Unlimited & Trout Unlimited Canada, supra note 5, at 3.
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transboundary river stocks.93 The Fraser River management was able to
maintain the U.S. harvest of Pink and Sockeye salmon while increasing the
Canadian harvest through stock enhancement and other management
techniques. 94  Further, the overall Sockeye runs increased from
approximately five million in the early 1980s to over fifteen million in the
1990s. 95  Trans-boundary rivers (including the Stikine, Taku, and Alsek
Rivers) also experienced increases in salmon stocks, made possible through
shared conservation responsibilities, 96  combined research, and stock
enhancement by the two countries.97
However, the Commission was less successful with Chinook
salmon.98  The harvest management plan failed to rebuild the Chinook99
stocks of Washington and Oregon. The Commission did establish a
management plan with specific escapement goals, 00 harvest ceilings in
Alaska and British Columbia, and reduced harvests in the Washington and
Oregon fisheries. Even so, the Chinook population failed to rebound.' 0
Pressures separate from harvesting limits, particularly the hydroelectric
dams and low instream flows on the Columbia and Snake Rivers, played a
large role in the continued decline of the population. 0 2 This problem was
magnified by the failure of the Commission to establish a system for
measuring and limiting the stocks and harvest. 0 3  Neither nation could
determine how many fish were being harvested, what country the fish came
from, or which nation was harvesting them.'
14
93 Id.
94 Stock enhancement generally means developing a hatchery program and using it to artificially
increase salmon stocks. Huppert, supra note 10, at 2.
9s de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 635. This increase was short lived and thus cannot be solely
attributed to the Fraser River Panel's management. Interview with Larry Rutter, Alternate Federal
Commissioner, Pacific Salmon Commission and Senior Policy Assistant, U.S. National Marine Fisheries
Service, in Lacey, Wash. (Jan. 17, 2001).
96 These responsibilities included habitat protection and management and were facilitated by both
nations. Id.
97 Id. at 636.
9s This failure is addressed in the 1999 Agreement with more species-specific management of
Chinook salmon. 1999 Agreement, supra note 15, Annex IV.
99 Id.
100 Escapement goals refer to the number of salmon that "escape" harvest and begin the journey
upstream to spawn.
101 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 636-37.
102 Dunn, supra note 51, at 165. Many would argue that the greatest cause of the failure to rebuild as
expected resulted from a significant downturn in ocean productivity. Rutter, supra note 96.
103 id.
104 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 637.
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2. Demise of the 1985 Treaty
In 1993, the management regimes in the 1985 Treaty expired and no
new regimes were implemented. This was primarily because of a lack of
agreement on how to implement the treaty's equity principle. 10 5 The key
problem was a perception by the Canadians that the United States continued
to increase its interception rates.10 6 Canadian sources reported that the
United States intercepted 5.3 million more fish than Canada in 1996
compared to 2.4 million more fish in 1985.107 This was an increase of over
100% and resulted in approximately 35 million fish, worth an estimated
(Can.) $500 million.108  The imbalance of interceptions was further
complicated by the large percentage of Canadian interceptions derived from
Washington and Oregon stocks. As those stocks decline, so do the amount
of Canadian interceptions, thus increasing the imbalance.' 
09
Both nations agreed that interceptions were a problem, but differed as
to the magnitude. For instance, between 1987 and 1991, Canada estimated
that the United States intercepted over four million salmon, while the United
States claimed it intercepted 785,000 fish.1 0 These estimates were based
largely on tagging programs and statistical sampling of harvests."' Results
of the statistical samples were often extrapolated across the U.S. and
Canadian fleets to estimate the number of interceptions."12 Such methods
allow substantial room for differing interpretations of the results."1
3
Differing market values of each salmon species further complicate the
notion of "equity." Article III (1)(b) of the 1985 Treaty required that each
nation receive the "benefits equivalent"'"14 to the salmon from its rivers.
However, the definition of "equivalent" has been widely disputed." '
Ensuring that equal numbers of fish are caught will not create equity when a
twenty-pound Chinook salmon is worth fifty times what a two-pound Pink
salmon is worth. 1 6 While not incorporated into the 1985 Treaty, the basic
'0' Id. at 636.
o6 Id. at 638.
'07 Id. at 640.
108 Id.
'0o Id. at 641.
110 Huppert, supra note 10, at 3.
I11 Id.
112 id.
113 Id.
14 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, art. III(1)(b).
15 Some feel that equality rests in equal numbers of fish caught while others focus on the market
value of that catch. McDorman, supra note 36, at 91.
116 Huppert, supra note 10, at 3.
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understanding between the nations was that Canadian interceptions of Coho
and Chinook would largely balance out U.S. interceptions of Fraser River
Sockeye. 17  Many Canadians perceived an imbalance at the outset, but
believed the Agreement to be a recipe for correcting the imbalance over
time. "'
As the Pacific salmon populations declined and the U.S. interceptions
rose, the tension between the nations increased." 9 The 1985 Pacific Salmon
Treaty's specific catch quotas120 expired in 1994. Prior to the 1994 season,
talks between the two nations broke down and no new long-term,
comprehensive agreement was reached.' 21  Once the agreement expired,
each nation was left to manage the resources in what again became a fierce
zero-sum game of fisheries brinkmanship.
The Canadian government maintained that U.S. interceptions far
outnumbered their own.' 22 Canada exerted pressure on the United States to
return to the bargaining table by imposing a "transit fee" on U.S. fishing123
boats using the Inside Passage, threatening to revoke the lease of the joint
U.S.-Canadian submarine base in Nanoose Bay,124 and by implementing a
"Canada First" fisheries management scheme 125  that was aimed at
transferring the U.S. catch to Canadian boats.126 Canadian fishers escalated
tensions by blockading an Alaskan ferry in Prince Rupert Sound for three
days to gain publicity for what they saw as an inequitable arrangement.
27
Alaskan fishers took advantage of the negotiation breakdown by taking three
times the catch allowed under the 1985 Treaty.
21
117 McDorman, supra note 36, at 92.
n Rutter, supra note 95.
119 For a comprehensive review of the salmon related problems that developed between the Canada
and the United States in the 1990s, see Jennifer MacDonald, Tensions Escalate between Canada and the
United States over Salmon, 1998 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 246 (1998).
:20 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, Annex IV, chs. 3-6.
121 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 651.
122 McDorman, supra note 36, at 95.
123 The Inside Passage is the 750-mile route used by ships from Washington to Alaska that runs
between Vancouver Island and the Canadian mainland. de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 652.
124 The threat to evict the United States from the submarine base came from British Columbia
Premier Clark who was more outspoken than the federal Canadian government. Id. at 662. The Canadian
government prevented the closure of the base by asserting that federal officials would expropriate the base
under federal jurisdiction. Id. Premier Clark never followed through on his threat. Id.
125 This policy allowed an unlimited catch of several salmon stocks, including Adams River Sockeye,
which were nearly fished to extinction in 1994. See MacDonald, supra note 119, at 250. A study showed
that twelve additional hours more of fishing would have permanently decimated the salmon run. Id.126 Id.
127 Blockade Ends; Ferry Sails; Fishermen Quit Prince Rupert Protest, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 22, 1997, at Al.
128 MacDonald, supra note 119, at 250.
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3. Events After the 1985 Treaty Breakdown
a. Lawsuits
As a result of the breakdown of the 1985 Treaty, several parties with
interests in Northwest salmon filed lawsuits in an attempt to stop other
parties from over-harvesting. For example, the Northwest Indian Tribes
filed suit against Alaska and in 1995, obtained a preliminary injunction
under the Baldridge stipulation to keep the state from harvesting an
excessive amount of salmon. 129 In 1997, Alaska filed a (Can.) $2.8 million
lawsuit for disruption of service against 200 Canadian boat owners who
blockaded the Alaskan ferry.' 30 Later that year, British Columbia's Premier
Clark filed a (Can.) $325 million lawsuit against the United States,
Washington, Alaska, and others for lost harvest share and revenues.1
31
b. Negotiations
Intermittent and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations took place
between 1993 and 1998. In 1994, each country appointed new negotiators
who attempted, but failed to resolve the deadlock on equity.' 32 An attempt
at mediation led by New Zealand ambassador Chris Beeby failed in 1997.133
The 1996 and 1997 "stakeholder" discussions that were led by
representatives from the major commercial fishing fleets and tribes, and
were overseen by government representatives, also failed largely because
neither side would agree to significantly reduce its own share of the
stocks.' 34 Ambassador Beeby proposed a formula to determine equity that
was based on the wholesale value of fish, quantified by price per pound. 135
The proposal would have likely forced the United States to reduce its harvest
levels or to pay compensation to Canada for its disproportionate
129 Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldridge, 898 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D.
Wash. 1995).
130 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 664. British Columbia Premier Clark offered to pay the legal
fees of the fishermen. Id. The Canadian government, along with the City of Prince Rupert, intervened and
settled with Alaska for a (Can.) $3 million marketing campaign designed to increase Alaskan tourism. Id.
... U.S. District Court Judge John Coughenour dismissed the case in January 1998, stating that a
decision would "impose a foreign policy decision on the executive branch." See de Zwager Brown, supra
note 4, at 665-67.
132 Trout Unlimited & Trout Unlimited Canada, supra note 5, at 5.
133 Id.
134 de Zwager Brown, supra note 4, at 658.
131 Id. at 657.
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interceptions. 36  While Canada embraced the method and saw it as
vindication, the United States rejected the proposal without comment.' 37
That same year, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and U.S. President
Bill Clinton appointed special representatives Dr. David Strangway and
William Ruckelshaus to discuss a solution and reinvigorate the
negotiations. 138
In January 1998, Ruckelshaus and Strangway issued a report to Prime
Minister Chretien and President Clinton. 139 The report made four key
recommendations: (1) termination of the stakeholder process; 40  (2)
development of interim fishing agreements for up to two years by the federal
governments; (3) development of a framework for implementing the equity
principle during the suggested period of interim agreement; and (4)
comprehensive review of the PSC and its functions by Canada and the
United States. 141 In the words of Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Oceans
David Anderson, the report suggested that in order to achieve agreement, the
United States must "move fish to Canada and that Canada must not expect to
receive every fish it believes it is owed."'142 This report set the stage for the
negotiations that ultimately resulted in the 1999 Pacific Salmon Treaty.
43
Political and biological pressures brought the two nations closer and
resulted in some temporary, but important, agreements. In the spring of
1998, Canadian scientists presented evidence to Minister Anderson that
several Canadian Coho salmon stocks' 44 were at risk of extinction,
regardless of the harvest level.' 45  Similar concerns arose about salmon
136 Id.
137 Id.
' STRANGWAY & RUCKELSHAUS, supra note 35.
139 Id.
140 This conclusion was not met with open arms in Washington, D.C. as Secretary of State Madeline
Albright issued a statement claiming that the State Department continues to view the process as "an
important resource" in solving the problems and that "stakeholders have an important continuing role in the
implementation of the report's recommendations. We are prepared, with the assistance of the stakeholders,
the involved states and tribal representatives, to pursue discussion to develop short-term and long-term
arrangements for Pacific salmon." Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement on Pacific Salmon
(Jan. 12, 1998), at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980112.html.
"' Id. STRANGWAY & RUCKELSHAUS, supra note 35.
142 David Anderson, Minister of Fisheries and Ocean, Update on the Pacific Salmon Treaty (Apr. 30,
1999), http://www.ncr.dfo.ca/COMMUNIC/Statem/1999/april3Oe.htm.
143 TROUT UNLIMITED & TROUT UNLIMITED CANADA, supra note 5, at 5.
'44 Of particular concern were Coho stocks in the Skeena and upper Thompson Rivers. See David
Anderson, Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Ocean, Address to the World Affairs Council: "Bilateral
Cooperation and Pacific Salmon" (Apr. 1, 1999), http://www.ncr.dfo.ca/communic/speech/1999/040
199 e.htm.
145 Id. In response, Canada adopted unprecedented measures to protect Coho, including: complete
closure of threatened stock fisheries and the announcement of a five year program to reduce the Canadian
commercial fleet, restore habitat and assist fishers to adjust to the changing industry. See Business Editors,
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stocks in Washington and Oregon, when the National Marine Fisheries
Service listed more species as threatened and endangered under the
Endangered Species Act.' 46  These pressures, and the attitudes of
reconciliation created by the Ruckelshaus and Strangway report, led to two
agreements between Canada and Washington State in June and July of
1998.147 In the first agreement, Washington agreed to reduce its catch of
Thompson River Coho by twenty-two percent.' 48 The second agreement
restricted when the Washington fleet could fish for Fraser River Sockeye,
but granted the fleet twenty-three percent of the total catch, a figure
comparable to previous seasons.149  While these agreements represented
Canada's first success at negotiation in nearly five years, 150 Canada failed in
its efforts to reach an agreement with Alaska.15'
In January 1999, Canada and the United States increased their push
for an agreement in time for the next summer season. Negotiations heated
up and the doors closed. 52 No minutes were taken and the meetings were
confined to diplomats only. 153 By April, President Clinton appointed special
representative Lloyd Cutler, a specialist in dispute resolution, to lead the
U.S. negotiating team.' 54 His chief role was to coordinate with the multiple
parties on the U.S. side (i.e., Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and the Treaty
Tribes). 55  This appointment of a high-level White House representative
was taken by many as a sign that the United States was more determined
than in years past to work through the differences between the two
nations. 156 As the two nations entered negotiations, Minister Anderson
publicly declared, "the atmosphere has been more constructive than any we
Fisheries and Oceans Canada-Canada And U.S. Reach A Comprehensive Agreement Under The Pacific
Salmon Treaty, BUSINESS WIRE, June 3, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File. This program cost
(Can.) $400 million. Id.
'4 Biological Opinion, supra note 21, at 2.
147 Anderson, supra note 144.
148 Id.
149 ld.
15o David Anderson, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Statement on Interim Arrangements on
Southern Fisheries for 1998, July 3, 1998, http://www.ncr.dfo.ca/COMMUNIC/Speech/1998/july3e.htm.
151 Update on the Pacific Salmon Treaty (Apr. 30, 1999) supra note 142.
152 Rutter, supra note 95.
153 Id.
15 Update on the Pacific Salmon Treaty (Apr. 30, 1999), supra note 142.
155 id.
156 Id. The chief negotiator for Canada was Don McRea and his counterpart on the U.S. side was Jim
Pipkin. David Anderson, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Statement on the Pacific Salmon Treaty (June
3, 1999), http://www.ncr.dfo.ca/COMMUNIC/Statem/1999/Jun3_e.htm.
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have seen in a decade."' 57 That atmosphere ultimately led to a new and
significantly altered agreement.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE 1999 PACIFIC SALMON AGREEMENT
"Men keep to agreements when it is to the advantage of neither
to break them." Ascribed to Solon, c.630-c.560 B.C.' 58
On June 3, 1999, Canada and the United States signed the 1999
Pacific Salmon Agreement.159 In a joint statement, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright and Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy
claimed "the agreement represents a victory for all those on both sides of the
border interested in salmon conservation and the long term viability of our
salmon industries.' 160 The Agreement took effect on June 30, 1999.161 The
1999 Agreement has four main elements: (1) Abundance Based
Management Regimes; (2) two Pacific Salmon Treaty Endowment Funds;
(3) a renewed commitment to scientific cooperation; and (4) a joint
commitment by both nations to protect and restore salmon habitat. 162 In
addition to these elements of the 1999 Agreement, the Diplomatic Notes
exchanged during the signing required the United States to follow a schedule
of payment into the Endowment Funds and conduct a review of the
Agreement under the Endangered Species Act.'
63
157 David Anderson, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Statement on the Pacific Salmon Treaty (May
28, 1999), http://www.ncr.dfo.ca/COMMtUNIC/Statem/1999/may28 e.hti.
'58 ELIZABETH FROST-KNAPPMAN & DAVID S. SHRAGER, THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 10 (1998).
:59 1999 Agreement, supra note 15.
60 Press Statement by Spokesman James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of State (June 3, 1999),
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/ 999/ps990603.html. Canadian Fisheries Minister
David Anderson hailed the agreement as the beginning of a "new era of effective conservation and more
equitable sharing of the precious salmon resource." Anderson, supra note 156. Vice President Al Gore
maintained that the "agreement is absolutely integral to our long-term strategy to bring the salmon back."
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Vice President, Statement by Vice President Gore (June 3,
1999), http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lpress/060399_3.html.
363 1999 Agreement, supra note 15.
162 id.
363 Id. Diplomatic Notes (June 30, 1999). For additional analysis of the 1999 Agreement, see Sunny
Knight, International LawL Treaties: Salmon Revcovery and the Pacific Salmon Treaty, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q.
855 (2000), and Ted McDorman, The 1999 Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Agreement: Resolved and
Unresolved Issues, 15 J. ENVTL. L & LrrTG. 1 (2000).
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A. Abundance Based Management Regimes
The first element, the Abundance Based Management Regimes
("ABMR"), reflects an increased commitment by both nations to the
"conservation principle." Instead of the rigid fixed- ceilings in the 1985
Treaty, harvest limits in the 1999 Agreement are allowed to fluctuate
according to the strength of the salmon population in any given year.164
Despite its variability, this new regime has greater permanence than the
regimes established by the 1985 Treaty. Harvest amounts will vary each
year, but the formulas used to determine those amounts are fixed for a
minimum of ten years.
65
The ABMR were intended to fix past problems.' 66  The general
organizational framework of the 1985 Treaty was to establish fixed catch
amounts or "ceilings" on the total amount of fish harvested at a number of
key fisheries.' 67 This inflexible approach created an environment where
fishers saw the limits as guaranteed quotas or entitlements, regardless of the
stock abundance. 68 Meanwhile, fisheries managers in each country felt
bound by the Treaty to allow harvest up to the ceiling.
69
While fixed ceilings were intended to spread harvest reductions over a
thirteen-year rebuilding period, they failed to do so.' 70 Fluctuating survival
rates complicated the system. For example, southern Chinook return rates
were higher than expected in the immediate years following the
implementation of the 1985 Treaty, but then declined sharply in later
years. 172 Reductions in rates of exploitation were not enough to restore the
wild populations.' 73 As stated by the Canadian Department of Fisheries and
Oceans, the fixed ceiling approach "was insensitive to stock abundance, was
based on little knowledge of which stocks were caught and their relative
health, and ignored in-season adjustment to fishing effort.' 74 Canadian and
:64 Dunn, supra note 51, at 169.
165 Id.
166 Backgrounder, Abundance Based Management Regimes, Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Canada, http://www.ncr.dfo.ca/COMMUNIC/BACKGROU/1999/hq29(102)_e.htm.
167 1985 Treaty, supra note 12.
168 Backgrounder, Abundance-Based Management Regimes, supra note 166.
169 Anderson, supra note 156.
170 TROUT UNLIMITED & TROUT UNLIMITED CANADA, supra note 5, at 8.
171 id.
172 Id.
173 id.
174 Backgrounder, Abundance-Based Management Regimes, supra note 166.
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U.S. officials realized that the fixed ceiling approach was inferior to a more
flexible harvest rate approach.1
75
The realization that the fixed ceiling approach was not working
resulted in a fundamental shift to the ABMR system in the 1999
Agreement. 176  The intent of the ABMR system is to base the allowable
harvest on the amount of fish returning to the fisheries covered under the six
Chapters in Annex IV. 177 In most cases, the relevant PSC committee 178 will
determine a pre-season forecast of the estimated stock return in a given
fishery.' 79 Each fishery may have a management plan previously agreed to
by the Commission, and the committee may develop the forecast model
based on the guidelines of that plan. 180 In many cases, the committee may
modify the forecast model at any point before the beginning of the season.81
From the forecast, weekly estimates of the Total Allowable Catch ("TAC")
can be made. 82 Both Canadian and U.S. fishing practices may be based on
TACs.' 83  In some fisheries, the pre-season estimates will be used until a
specified time in the season,' 84 after which the TAC is revised using an in-
season forecast model. 85  If the committee cannot come to an agreement
during a given season, the committee may use the TAC from previous years
instead. 18
6
While the pre-season and in-season TAC levels are flexible, the
ABMR procedures are fixed.' 87  The mechanisms for determining the
harvest levels are more functionally robust than procedures under the 1985
"5 TROUT UNLIMrrED & TROUT UNLIMITED CANADA, supra note 5, at 8. The framers of the 1985
Treaty probably did not regard fixed ceilings as superior. Rather, they likely seemed adequate to the task
and consistent with capabilities at the time. Rutter, supra note 95.
176 Backgrounder, Abundance-Based Management Regimes, supra note 166.
177 As outlined in Annex IV of the 1999 Agreement, the six regimes are: (1) Trans-boundary Rivers;
(2) Northern British Columbia and Southeastern Alaska; (3) Chinook; (4) Fraser River Sockeye and Pink
Salmon; (5) Coho Salmon; and (6) Southern British Columbia and Washington State Chum. 1999
Agreement, supra note 15, Annex IV, chs. 1-6.
178 Usually one of the regime panels or technical committees is assigned to a given area.
Backrounder, Abundance-Based Management Regimes, supra note 166.
79 Id.
180 1999 Agreement, supra note 15, Annex IV.
]81 Id.
182 Backgrounder, Abundance-Based Management Regimes, supra note 166.
183 id.
'8 The specified time is often halfway through the season, or a point after which enough data has
been collected to make an educated analysis of in-season stock returns. Id.
'85 Using "in-season" management techniques is not a revolutionary idea, even within the context of
the Pacific Salmon Treaty. In an attached Memorandum of Understanding to the 1985 Treaty, the section
on data sharing includes an agreement to "explore the feasibility of in-season management." 1985 Treaty,
supra note 12, Memorandum of Understanding, pt. B(h).
186 See generally 1999 Agreement, supra note 15, Annex IV.
187 Id.
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Treaty because they do not require a yearly consensus for their operation.
The 1999 Agreement fixes the procedural terms and processes for
determining the estimates and TAC levels for five of the six Pacific salmon
fisheries for ten years, 188 while the process for the Fraser River Sockeye and
Pink fishery is locked in for twelve years.' 89 These "long-term" fisheries
regimes remove one of the crippling elements of the 1985 Treaty: the need
for periodic consensus.'9°
Ostensibly, the positive elements of the ABMR system outweigh the
possible drawbacks. The nations acknowledge that this scheme requires
greater cooperation, greater scientific input and greater quantities of timely
information.' 9' Furthermore, the refusal of the United States to alter its
current consensus based decision-making within its section may prove
detrimental to the process. 192 Disagreements between the states, tribes and
the federal government have caused delay and even stalemates in the past,
and may continue to do so under the new agreement. 93  However, both
nations also maintain that the ABMR systems are more responsive to
variance in stock returns, reflect modem conservation-based fishing
practices, and reduce the bias in previous models to over-fish the resource.
94
B. Structure of the Restoration and Enhancement Funds
The 1999 Agreement also created two funds (the "Funds"), the
Northern Boundary and Trans-boundary Rivers Restoration and
Enhancement Fund (the "Northern Fund"'195) and the Southern Boundary
"' Id. chs. 1-3, 5, 6.
189 Treaty, supra note 15, Annex IV. The U.S. catch of Fraser River Sockeye in Washington Waters
will decline from 22.4% of the TAC in 1999, to 20.4% in 2000, to 18.4% in 2001, and to 16.5% from 2002
to 2010. Id. This compares with the 1998 agreement's figure of 24.9% and the historical average of 20.5%
between 1985 and 1996. Anderson, supra note 156.
190 Dunn, supra note 51, at 169. The 1985 Treaty management regimes were usually multi-year and
required consensus when the regimes expired. The lack of agreement for new terms usually resulted in
"rolling over" the previous regime. This practice largely continued through 1992, then largely broke down
as Canada increased its equity demands. Rutter, supra note 96.
191 Backgrounder, Abundance-Based Management Regimes, supra note 166.
192 Knight, supra note 163.
193 Id.
194 Backgrounder, Abundance-Based Management Regimes, supra note 166.
195 "The geographic area for the Northern Fund shall be Northern and Central British Columbia,
Southeast Alaska, and the drainage of the Alsek, Taku and Stikine Rivers." 1999 Agreement, supra note
15, Annex IV, attachment C, Northern Boundary and Transboundary Rivers Restoration and Enhancement
Fund, para. 2.
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Restoration and Enhancement Fund (the "Southern Fund"196), consisting of
(U.S.) $75 and $65 million, respectively. 197  Three main functions of the
Funds are outlined in the Agreement: (1) "development of improved
information for resource management;"' 98 (2) "rehabilitation and restoration
of habitat;"'199 and (3) "enhancement of wild stock population., 200
Under the 1999 Agreement, U.S. Congressional appropriations are the
exclusive mandatory source of money for the funds.2°1 The Diplomatic
Notes of the Agreement mandate that payments to these funds be completed
by 2003 or the Agreement may be suspended.0 2 The willingness to accept
the establishment of these bilateral funds as part of an overall settlement
represented a significant change in negotiating posture by the Canadian
government.20 3 Facing a stalemate, the Canadians decided to forego their
claims of past interception inequity in exchange for a package that included
the new fishery regimes and the creation and financing of the Funds.2°4 This
change was perhaps the most defining move of the negotiation process, and
allowed the talks to ultimately proceed to agreement.20
The Northern Fund Committee and Southern Fund Committee, each
composed of six members with three representatives from each nation, will
distribute the money.20 6 None of the principal of the Funds will be spent;
only the earnings and interest derived from the invested capital of the Funds
196 "The geographic area for the Southern Fund shall be southern British Columbia, the States of
Washington and Oregon, and the Snake River basin in Idaho." Id. Annex IV, attachment C, Southern
Boundary Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para. 2.
'9' Id. attachment C.
198 Development of improved information includes "better stock assessment, data acquisition, and
improved scientific understanding of factors affecting salmon production in the freshwater marine
environments." Id. Annex IV, attachment C, Northern Boundary and Transboundary Rivers Restoration
and Enhancement Fund, para. 3(a); id. Annex IV, attachment C, Southern Boundary Restoration and
Enhancement Fund, para. 3(a).
199 This purpose also includes "improvement of natural habitat to enhance productivity and protection
of Pacific salmon." Id. Annex IV, attachment C, Northem Boundary and Transboundary Rivers
Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para. 3(b); id. Annex IV, attachment C, Southern Boundary
Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para. 3(b).
20o Enhancement of wild stock population will occur "through low technology techniques rather than
through large facilities with high operating costs." Id. Annex IV, attachment C, Northern Boundary and
Transboundary Rivers Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para. 3(c); id. Annex IV, attachment C,
Southern Boundary Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para. 3(c).
201 Id. Other parties may contribute of their own accord, but the Fund amounts are explicitly set to be
paid by the United States. Id. Annex IV, attachment C, Northern Boundary and Transboundary Rivers
Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para. 4; id. Annex IV, attachment C, Southern Boundary Restoration
and Enhancement Fund, para. 4.
202 Id. Diplomatic Notes.
203 Rutter, supra note 95.
204 id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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may be expended.2 °7  Evaluation and approval of proposals for use of the
income of the Funds are subject to procedures developed by the
Committees.20 8 These approval procedures are currently in the early stages
of development by the Committees. 20 9 No provisions for public comment
have yet been added, although such provisions are under consideration.
21 0
According to Annex IV of the 1999 Agreement, no allocations will be
distributed from the Funds after 2010 (when four out of the six regimes for
determining the estimates and TAC levels are scheduled to expire) unless
new regimes are put in place.
21 1
Similar to the ESA review requirements discussed below in Part V,
two critical facets of the Northern Fund and Southern Fund-the payment
schedule and the implications of failure to meet that schedule-are not part
of the language of the Agreement itself, but rather the Diplomatic Notes that
212
were exchanged as attachments to the Agreement. Both Notes exchanged
require that the Agreement "shall be subject to the obtaining of specific
legislative authority from the United States Congress" for the Funds.2 T The
Notes also outline a strict payment schedule, 1 4 which effectively makes the
agreement conditional upon the arrival of (U.S.) $140 million to the PSC
within four year's time.2 t 5
Despite worrisome implications in the FY 2000 budget cycle, recent
indications from the U.S. Congress are that the 2003 deadline for total
207 Id. Annex IV, attachment C, Northern Boundary and Transboundary Rivers Restoration and
Enhancement Fund, para.6; id. Annex IV, attachment C, Southern Boundary Restoration and Enhancement
Fund, para. 6.
-0 rAn^.. !V, attachmv.ent C, Ne.,thern Beunda.-, a Tr--nsbonndan, R vers lRetnor--tn andl
Enhancement Fund, para.7; id. Annex IV, attachment C, Southern Boundary Restoration and Enhancement
Fund, para. 7.
2ud Rutter, supra note 95.
210 Id.
211 1999 Agreement, supra note 15, Annex IV, attachment C, Northern Boundary and Transboundary
Rivers Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para.8; id. Annex IV, attachment C, Southern Boundary
Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para. 8. The Fraser River Sockeye and Pink regime and the Coho
regime were excluded from this protection. Funding of approved projects may resume once new
agreements are made on these regimes. Id. In the event that new agreements are not made, the principle
and any remaining interest derived from it will escheat back to the nation that contributed it. Id. Annex IV,
attachment C, Northern Boundary and Transboundary Rivers Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para.9;
id. Annex IV, attachment C, Southern Boundary Restoration and Enhancement Fund, para. 9. While the
Funds are explicitly funded by the United States, voluntary contributions may be made by either party. Id.
212 Id. Diplomatic Notes.
213 Id.
214 The Notes read: "(I)n the event that the United States Government does not make initial funds
available for the Funds by December 31, 1999, or in the event that additional installment payments to these
Funds are not made by the end of U.S. fiscal year 2001 or by the end of U.S. fiscal year 2002, or in the
event that total payment for the two Funds is not made available by the end of the U.S. Fiscal year 2003, all
of the obligations under this Agreement shall be suspended until such funds are available." Id.
215 Id.
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payment will be met. The first round of appropriations by Congress for FY
2000 added up to approximately (U.S.) $10 million for each fund. While it
did not violate the specific terms of the agreement, this amount was not
enough to keep on track to meet the 2003 deadline. In the most recent round
of appropriations (for FY 2001) however, Congress allocated approximately
(U.S.) $20 million for each fund. Both sets of allocations have been under
the State Department and Commerce Department budgets. Congress also
gave general authorization for full payments into the Funds through 2003.
While the Departments of State and Commerce will have to seek actual
appropriation in the next two budget cycles, the blanket authorization
removes a major obstacle for the Funds.216
C. Renewed Commitment to Scientific Cooperation
The 1999 Agreement introduced a section promoting the "renewed
commitment to scientific cooperation. 21 7  Attachment D of the 1999
Agreement recognizes the importance of consultation and cooperation on
science and information exchange and management to maintain the stability
of the ABMRs and the 1999 Agreement itself.218 Attachment D encourages
cooperation including staff exchanges, workshops, and data exchange.219 It
also renamed the "Committee on Research and Statistics" the "Committee
on Scientific Cooperation. 22 °
The emphasis on cooperation in attachment D is similar to language in
the 1985 Treaty.22 A Memorandum of Understanding attached to the 1985
222Treaty listed numerous agreements to cooperate between the nations. In
addition, the 1985 Treaty explicitly and repeatedly mentioned the
importance of cooperation to avoid an imbalance of interceptions.
223
Moreover, it emphasized the need for precise and comprehensive
measurement and data collection regarding interceptions.224
The section on renewed cooperation in the 1999 Agreement does not
emphasize the importance of measuring and reducing interceptions. The
word interception does not even appear in the language of the 1999
216 Rutter, supra note 95.
217 1999 Agreement, supra note 15, attachment D.
218 id.
219 Id. para. (b).
220 Id. para. (d).
221 1985 Treaty, supra note 12, Memorandum of Understanding.
222 Id.
223 Id. Memorandum of Understanding pt. A.
224 Id. Memorandum of Understanding pt. B.
MAY 2001
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Agreement.225 Instead, the 1999 Agreement encourages the identification of
"emerging issues," "the development of common assessment models[,]" and
the distinguishing of "technical and policy issues[.], 226 This difference
between the two Treaties reflects the agreement between Canada and the
United States to exclude the question of equity in interceptions from the
negotiations.
D. Joint Commitment to Protect and Restore Salmon Habitat
The 1999 Agreement recognizes the importance of habitat restoration
and protection in the larger scheme of abundance based management.227 The
language recognizes the need to restore habitat, water quality, and water
quantity in an effort to both increase the levels of natural stocks and to
promote safe passage for juvenile and adult salmon.228 The Agreement
requests that the PSC give an annual report on the stocks that harvest
controls alone will not protect and on the non-fishing factors affecting safe
passage of salmon.229
The language about the joint commitment by both nations to protect
and restore salmon habitat is vague. 230 However, appropriations for habitat
restoration by both nations to date suggest that they consider this joint
commitment just as important as the exchange of scientific information. 3'
An initiative begun by Canada prior to the agreement, as well as efforts
made by the Clinton Administration after the agreement, indicate that this
commitment may prove important in the overall scheme of salmon recovery.
The Canadian government launched a five-year, (Can.) $400 million
program to restore salmon habitat, reduce their commercial fleet, and
provide employment assistance for displaced fishers.232 In the United States,
Senior White House Representative Lloyd Cutler promised that "the
Administration will work closely with Congress to ensure that we can
provide the resources needed to undertake these vital recovery efforts. 233
Through the end of its term, the Clinton Administration followed through on
225 1999 Agreement, supra note 15, attachment D.
226 Id. attachment D, (d), (i)-(iii).
227 Id. attachment E.
228 Id.
229 Id. attachment E, (2).
230 Id. attachment E.
231 Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Conservation Means More Fish for Canada's
Future, at http://www.ncr.dfo.ca/pst-tsp/ads/adl_e.htm.
232 Id.
233 See Rubin, supra note 160.
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that promise, by securing a (U.S.) $100 million in salmon funding for 1999
and 2000.234
V. ANALYSIS OF THE 1999 PACIFIC SALMON AGREEMENT
The 1999 Agreement represents progress and compromise in the
Pacific salmon saga. Interest groups have complemented and criticized its
provisions. The new management regimes, combined with the U.S. funded
Restoration and Enhancement Funds, allowed Canada to give ground on its
claim of past inequity. The United States ensured that the ABMR, and the
Agreement as a whole, would be subject to review under the Endangered
Species Act. This review was conducted within the time allotted by the
agreement, but did not include fisheries in Washington and Oregon.
A. Criticisms by Interest Groups
While the 1999 Agreement is indicative of harmony between the
governments of Canada and the United States, interest groups within those
countries have been vocal, albeit qualified, in their criticism of the new
agreement. Commercial fishers from Alaska and Washington claimed that
the United States negotiators relinquished too large a share of the harvest to
Canada. British Columbia First Nations 235 maintained that Canada signed
the agreement without adequate consultation of their members.
Environmental groups from both countries have questioned the ability of the
1999 Agreement to bring Pacific salmon back from the brink of extinction.
Commercial fishers from both Alaska and Washington felt that the
compromise gave away too large a share of their annual harvest. In
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Resources, Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans,
Jev Shelton of the United Southeast Alaska Gillnetters stated that "[i]n the
pressure to "get a deal," concessions were made to Canada in virtually every
southeast Alaska fishery ... as well as the non-tribal Sockeye fishery in
Washington state., 236  In the same hearing, Robert Zuanich, Executive
"4 This (U.S.) $100 million includes the funding sought for the Endowment Funds. In FY 2001,
(U.S.) $90 million was appropriated for salmon recovery to the states and Tribes, not counting the bilateral
funds. Similar amounts are proposed in the President's budget for FY 2002. Rutter, supra note 95.
235 The native peoples and tribes of Canada generally chose to be called First Nations.
236 Hearing on the 1999 Pacific Salmon Treaty Before the House Comm. on Resources, Subcomm. on
Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans: 105th Cong. 2 (Oct. 28, 1999) (statement of Jev Shelton,
United Southeast Alaska Gillnetters). Mr. Shelton also spoke on behalf of the Alaska Trollers Association
and the Southeast Alaska Seiners. Id.
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Director of the Purse Seine Vessel Owners Association, related his
disappointment that U.S. negotiators conceded a harvest reduction to 16.5%
of Fraser River Sockeye (instead of 18% agreed to by his association) and
that the reductions would occur regardless of the establishment and funding
of an adequate buyback program.237 Zuanich underscored the importance of
implementing and fully funding a program to buy back commercial fishing
licenses and provide economic assistance to those families affected buy the
harvest reduction.238
British Columbia First Nations have also raised concerns with
elements of the 1999 Agreement, but more specifically, challenge the failure
of the Canadian government to consult them before signing the agreement.
The British Columbia Aboriginal Fisheries Commission ("BCAFC") stated
that the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans ("DFO") has "fail[ed]
miserably in their duty to consult with First Nations" regarding harvest
levels and the 1999 Agreement. 239 BCAFC maintained that the Canadian
government should have consulted First Nations under a fiduciary duty set
out in R. v. Sparrow, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.240 Due to
frustration with the implementation of the 1999 Agreement by the DFO,
BCAFC issued a statement on January 26, 2000 "declaring war regarding
their rights and title to the fisheries in BC.",
24 1
Environmental groups from both the United States and Canada have
made cautionary statements regarding the 1999 Agreement. In testimony
before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Resources,
Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans, Steve
Moyer, Trout Unlimited Vice-President for Conservation Programs, stated
that the "new agreement wisely moves from ceiling management to
abundance based management regimes ... but there is some danger that the
abundance levels chosen may be too high for protection of depleted wild
237 Hearing on the 1999 Pacific Salmon Treaty Before the House Comm. on Resources, Subcomm. on
Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans: 105th Cong. (Oct. 28, 1999) (statement of Robert Zuanich,
Executive Director, Purse Seine Vessel Owners Association). Mr. Zuanich is also a member of the U.S.
Fraser River Panel of the Pacific Salmon Commission. Id.
238 Id. The U.S. Congress has delivered on (U.S.) $25 million of its promised (U.S.) $35 million for
the buyback funding and the remainder is in the FY 2002 budget request. Rutter, supra note 96.239 Press Release, British Columbia Aboriginal Fisheries Commission, First Nations in BC Are
Declaring War Regarding Their Rights and Title to the Fishery, (Jan. 26, 2000), at http://www.bcafc.org/
pr/war 26jan00.html.
24 Press Release, British Columbia Aboriginal Fisheries Commission, First Nations Bear Brunt of
the Pacific Salmon Treaty, (Aug. 23, 1999), at http://www.bcafc.org/pr/brunt_23aug99.htmI.
241 Press Release, British Columbia Aboriginal Fisheries Commission, supra note 239. The BCAFC
mentions other sources of frustration with the DFO in their press release. For an exploration of their
perspectives and issues visit http://www.bcafc.org.
VOL. 10 No. 3
1999 PACIFIC SALMON AGREEMENT
stocks of salmon., 242 Furthermore, a British Columbia based environmental
group questioned the accuracy of the ABMRs and the ability of the
"aggregate" model systems to adjust to the variable needs of the fishery.243
B. Negotiation Breakthrough: Canada's Sea Change
The key breakthrough in treaty negotiations came when Canada
ostensibly dropped its claim for compensation for historical inequities in
salmon interception. In exchange for this concession, the United States
agreed to exclusively finance the two Restoration and Enhancement Funds, a
major element of the 1999 Agreement.244 While observers agree that this
arrangement was the breakthrough in negotiations, the official public from
the Department of State gave no explanation of why the United States is
245funding the entire amount. Canadian public statements have similarly
ignored fact that the United States is the only nation appropriating money for
the Funds.246 Nevertheless, the discrepancy in the funding source was a key
element of a larger package that allowed Canada to accept an agreement
without compensation for its historical claim of inequity.
As discussed in Part II, infra, the single most contentious issue in
negotiating the 1999 Agreement was the problem of interceptions and
conflict over the "equity principle. 247 For many years prior to the 1999
Agreement, Canada claimed that United States interceptions outnumbered
and out-valued the Canadian interceptions by millions of dollars.248
Regardless of whether this inequity was as great as the Canadians perceived
it, the issue was a large impediment to an agreement.249 Prior to the
negotiations, Canada maintained that the "equity principle" was the critical
piece of the 1985 Treaty. Conversely, the United States argued that the
242 Hearing on the 1999 Pacific Salmon Treaty Before the House Comm. on Resources, Subcomm. on
Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans: 105th Cong. (Oct. 28, 1999) (statement of Steve Moyer,
Vice President for Conservation Programs, Trout Unlimited).
243 David Lane, T. Buck Suzuki Environmental Foundation, Pacific Salmon Treaty Flawed, available
at http://www.bcen.bc.ca/bcerart/Vol 10/pacifics.htm.
T 1999 Agreement, supra 15, Annex IV, attachment C.
245 Press Statement by Spokesman James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of State (June 3, 1999), supra
note 160.
246 Anderson, supra note 160.
247 In an updated article on the 1999 Agreement, Professor McDorman agreed that "the core of the
Canada-United States Pacific salmon dispute lies in the differing views of the two countries with respect to
the quantity that fishers from each country can and should harvest consistent with both the conservation
and the state of origin principle." McDorman, supra note 163.
248 Huppert, supra note 10, at 12.
24' Rutter, supra note 95. Larry Rutter serves on the Pacific Salmon Commission and was a part of
the 1999 Pacific Salmon Treaty U.S. Negotiation Team.
250 Id.
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"conservation principle" was of greater concern, given the vast salmon
population reductions. 251 As discussed earlier in Part II, the vague language
of the Treaty allowed for various interpretations of both principles and left a
chasm between the two nations.
Approaching the negotiations, Canada had three major objectives for
the new agreement. 252  First, Canada wanted a conservation-based
arrangement that provided an improved basis for addressing conservation
issues.253 Second, Canada wanted fish allocations transferred to Canada
from the U.S. 254 Third, Canada wanted to create a solid foundation for the
parties to cooperate in the future.255
By setting these objectives, the Canadian negotiating team side
stepped the equity issue (if only for the moment) to allow a compromise on
the overall package that the 1999 Agreement represents. Canadian
negotiation team member Paul Spout maintained that Canadian acquiescence
was based on their "evaluation of the overall set of measures," not simply
because the United States agreed to pay for the Funds.256 Sprout further
stated that Canada never set aside its claim to equity but was "creative in
constructing a total package that both sides could agree to."257
This perspective created a win-win situation for both the United States
and Canada. While it is likely true that Canada did not permanently set aside
its legal claim to equity, at the very least they reprioritized to accommodate
an agreement. The United States did not acknowledge the interception
imbalance, but they did commit to financing all (U.S.) $140 million of the
Funds. 258 Through this mechanism, each nation was able to walk away from
the table with an apparent victory.259
The Funds were instrumental in allowing each side to frame the
debate in a novel way and to sidestep the equity issue that had frustrated the
negotiations for decades. 260 By constructing a mechanism through which
Canada could avoid the obstacle to success, the Canadian leadership
251 Id.
252 Telephone interview with Paul Sprout, Canadian Negotiation Team Member and Acting Associate
Assistant Deputy Minister of Fisheries Management, Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Jan. 30,
2001.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 id.
256 id.
257 Id.
258 Rutter, supra note 95.
259 id.
260 id.
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fundamentally changed the debate. 261 This shift in negotiating posture
demonstrated that Canada was committed to both the survival of the Treaty
and the survival of salmon. The Canadian team viewed U.S. financing of
the Funds in light of the other major changes in the 1999 Agreement.262 The
Canadian negotiators viewed the ABMRs, the renewed commitment to
scientific cooperation, the commitment to habitat restoration, and the Funds
as a "whole package" that they found adequate for the needs of Canadian
fishers and the salmon.263 The strongest influence came from Minister
Anderson. 264 In reflecting on the positive shift in Canadian position, U.S.
negotiator and NMFS Senior Policy Assistant Larry Rutter concluded that
Minister Anderson "deserves more of the credit for the sea change in
Canadian philosophy than anyone., 265 Both Rutter and Sprout agree that the
1999 Agreement was reached by virtue of a large package of concessions,
from both sides, that included the AMBR and the Funds.
Canada may also have realized weaknesses in its legal claim to
"equity., 267 While both U.S. and Canadian figures do show an interception
imbalance, observers agree that the "equity principle" is not a binding
one. 26 This is because the terms of the equity principle are largely unclear
as a matter of international law. Mechanisms for determining and
monitoring equity were never established and there was no binding
timeline. While the claims had merit in public eye, they may have proven
to be more valuable at the negotiating table as a concession rather than an
270obstacle to agreement.
C. Endangered Species Act Review
The ABMR, and the 1999 Agreement in its entirety, are subject to the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act and the requirements discussed
in the Diplomatic Notes exchanged at the signing of the Agreement. The
1973 U.S. Endangered Species Act ("ESA") provides that all major federal
261 Id.
262 Sprout, supra note 252.
23 id.
264 id.
265 Id. Canadian Negotiation Team member Paul Sprout agreed, stating that "Mr. Anderson was
crucial in saying the priority has to be the resource; to put the fish first." Sprout, supra note 252.266 Id.; Rutter, supra note 95.
267 McDorman, supra note 36, at 96-98.
268 id.
269 Id. at 97.
270 id.
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actions affecting listed species are subject to review by the listing agency. 271
Furthermore, the Diplomatic Notes explicitly state that "each Government
shall take the necessary steps to implement the obligations under this
Agreement consistent with its national laws. ' 72 Thus, in order to remain in
force, the 1999 Agreement must comply with the ESA.
1. Requirements of Endangered Species Act and the Diplomatic Notes
a. Endangered Species Act requirements
The actual language of the 1999 Agreement does not explicitly require
an ESA analysis of the Agreement, but the review is required by operation
of Federal law. The ESA requires that all major federal actions that affect
listed species undergo review by the "listing agency".273 This review of one
federal agency by another is generally referred to as a "Section 7
consultation," named after the section of the ESA that requires it.274 Since
Pacific salmon are an anadromous species, the listing agency and thus the
review agency is the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS").275
Under regulations adopted by NMFS, if the proposed agency "action
' 276
"may affect listed species or critical habitat," the initiation of consultation
277
with NMFS is mandatory. The "may affect" decision is normally based
on a "biological assessment" conducted by the acting federal agency or
NMFS. 278 If a "may affect" decision is reached, NMFS may then begin a
formal consultation and the drafting of a "biological opinion., 279  In this
process, NMFS evaluates the status of the species, its habitat, direct and
indirect effects of the action, and the cumulative effects of private and state
action in the larger area.28° Ultimately, the process concludes in a biological
opinion with a finding of either "jeopardy" or "no-jeopardy" regarding the
271 Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act requires consultation by the Secretary with the
action agency if the action is likely to affect a listed species." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2001).
272 1999 Agreement, supra note 15, Diplomatic Notes (June 30, 1999).
273 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
274 Id.
275 National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") is an agency of the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration, which is under the Department of Commerce.
The term "action" is defined in the regulations adopted by NMFS to mean "all activities or
programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies." 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (2001).
277 Id. § 402.14(a).
27 Id. § 402.12(b). NMFS regulations contain no mandatory content requirements for a biological
assessment, only recommendations. Id. § 402.12(0.
279 Id. § 402.14(e).
210 Id. § 402.14(g).
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action's effect on the species.281 If the NMFS makes a no-jeopardy finding,
it may issue an "incidental take statement," which permits the taking of a
listed species consistent with the terms of the statement and limits liability
under the prohibition on take in Section 9 of the ESA.282
b. Diplomatic Notes requirements
The Diplomatic Notes each explicitly state that implementation of the
Agreement by the United States "shall be contingent on a determination that
the Agreement satisfies the legal requirements under the United States'
Endangered Species Act., 283 The Diplomatic Notes also require the United
States to "fill those requirements" and "keep the Government of Canada
informed regarding this matter., 284 The Diplomatic Notes set a schedule for
compliance by stating that "in the event that the United States' Government
has failed to fulfill the legal requirements of the Endangered Species Act by
December 31, 1999, the obligations under this Agreement shall be
suspended pending fulfillment of those legal requirements. 285
Even though they are not in the actual language of the Agreement,
they are binding under the generally accepted methodology for interpreting a
treaty as outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
286
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that a "treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
objective and purpose., 287 Subsection 2(a) defines "context" to include "any
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty. 2 88 Since the Diplomatic Notes
were exchanged at the signing of the 1999 Agreement, they are in
connection with the conclusion of the Agreement and would likely be
289interpreted as "context" and thus a binding element of the Agreement.
281 See id.
282 Id.
283 1999 Agreement, Diplomatic Notes, supra 15.
284 id.
285 Id.
286 The United States never ratified the Vienna Convention. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 205 (David Hunter et al. eds., 1998). However, the U.S. Department of State has declared that
the principles expressed in the Convention are binding. Id.
287 id.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 222.
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2. NMFS Review of the 1999 Pacific Salmon Agreement
To comply with these ESA requirements, NMFS conducted a Section
7 inter-agency consultation with the U.S. Department of State. 290 Before the
December 31 deadline, NMFS issued a Biological Opinion on the 1999
Agreement.291  This is the first time NMFS has consulted directly on a
proposed fishery management plan involving specific harvest levels
applicable to Canadian fisheries.29
As NMFS embarked on the Section 7 consultation process, it was in a
precarious scientific and political position.29 3 Congress designed the
consultation procedures for agency actions of more corporeal nature than the
signing of a treaty.29 4 Furthermore, by virtue of being "abundance based,"
the management plans that NMFS was charged with analyzing, would
necessarily fluctuate from year to year and even within a given year, 295
making them difficult quantity to assess. Additionally, a finding that the
1999 Agreement places listed species in."jeopardy" would likely have upset
the delicate balance struck in the negotiations. After years of attempts and
stalemates, the United States and Canada had forged an agreement after
which both sides claimed victory. Disturbing the balance with a "jeopardy"
finding by NMFS would not have been politically expedient. The only clear
"reasonable and prudent" alternative for NMFS to suggest would have been
the undesirable result of revisiting the terms of the agreement in a
subsequent negotiation.296 Furthermore, NMFS felt it had to weigh the 1999
290 Biological Opinion, supra note 21, at 1.
291 id.
292 Id. at 2.
293 NMFS negotiator Larry Rutter was the ESA standard bearer in the negotiations. Adding another
condition to an already contentious negotiation was a difficult task for the delegates. However ensuring
compliance was his duty given the great attention to the listings of threatened and endangered salmon had
received in the prior decade, along with the natural role of the NMFS delegate as a steward of the ESA.
Thus the U.S. negotiators worked to make the terms of the 1999 Agreement consistent with ESA
requirements in order to avoid a conflict with its enforcement upon ratification. Rutter, supra note 95.
294 Normally the listing agency is confronted with a federal project to build a bridge in a critical
habitat area, permit a timber sale, or some similar physical action. The normal tools for scientific
assessment were not shaped for an action that, in a sense, amounted to a signature. However, listing
agencies do often undertake "programmatic" reviews that take into account broader systems and subjects.
Id. 295 Backgrounder, Abundance-Based Management Regimes, supra note 166.
296 Since the United States does not have jurisdiction over Canadian fisheries, the Department of State
could not impose restrictions on their harvest levels. Once the United States signed the Treaty, fishing
levels in Canada could not be revisited except under the terms of the agreement. Letter from William
Stelle, Regional Administrator, National Marine Fisheries Service, to Bill Frank Jr., Chairman, Northwest
Indian Fisheries Commission (Sept. 3, 1999) (on file with author).
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Agreement and its terms against the alternative of having no agreement.297
This context provided a strong incentive for NMFS to make a "no jeopardy"
finding before they even began the process. However, since the negotiators
were aware of the impending ESA review during the negotiations, their
work to ensure that compliance resulted in an agreement that was more
likely to comply.
298
Because of the pressing time constraints on the consultation, NMFS
skipped the biological assessment phase of the ESA Section 7 process and
proceeded directly to the biological opinion phase. 299 NMFS considered two
"proposed actions" by the United States.03°  The first was the formal
commitment of the United States to implement its fishery obligations
consistent with terms of the 1999 Agreement. 30' The second action was the
decision to delegate federal management authority to Alaska for those
fisheries within the EEZ off the coast of Alaska.30 2 NMFS determined that
the "action area' 3°3 was the "northern fisheries" which included "all marine
and freshwater areas in [Southeast Alaska] and [British Columbia] subject to
provisions of [the 1999 Agreement]."304
NMFS did not consider the "southern fisheries"30 5 in Biological
Opinion.30 6 NMFS listed three reasons for this decision. First, the southern
fisheries involve relatively few interceptions of Chinook from other
297 Id. This is a questionable assumption. While a "jeopardy" finding would have upset the
agreement, it is unclear that the balance struck between the nations was so delicate that revisiting the terms
would necessarily result in collapse. Given the advances that were made in the negotiations, a reasonable
assumption would have been that some agreement would survive and should be judged on its own terms,
not the lack thereof.
298 Rutter, supra note 95.
299 Id.
300 Biological Opinion, supra note 21, at 3.
301 Id.
30' The North Pacific Fisheries Management Council ("NPFMC") is the federal institution, which has
authority to manage fisheries in the United States EEZ. Under the April 1990 Fishery Management Plan
For The Salmon Fisheries In The EEZ Off The Coast Of Alaska, NPFMC deferred to the State the
regulation and management of Alaska salmon fisheries in the EEZ off the coast of Alaska. In 1996,
Alaska first indicated its intention to manage its fisheries patterned after the U.S. Letter of Agreement
("LOA") between the U.S. Commissioners of the PSC. In 1999, Alaska declared its intention to manage it
fisheries pursuant to the terms of the 1999 Agreement (which replaced the LOA), thus the Biological
Opinion considers the terms of the Treaty. Id.
303 "Action area" is defined in the NMFS regulations to mean "all areas to be affected directly or
indirectly by the Federal action and not merely the immediate area involved in the action." 50 C.F.R. §
402.02.
304 Biological Opinion, supra note 21, at 7.
305 Though not defined in the Biological Opinion, "southern fisheries" presumably includes the
fisheries off the coasts of Washington and Oregon.
306 Biological Opinion, supra note 21, at 7.
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jurisdictions.3 °7 Second, NMFS asserted that these fisheries "are actually a
complex of fisheries managed by a number of different entities that involve
three states and many tribes," and they are managed by other processes,
308
such as the Pacific Fishery Management Council, the North of Falcon
30 9
process, the state and tribal management decision under the United States v.
Washington, and the Baldridge stipulation.310 Third, the recent ESA listings
in the area and the subsequent "4(d)" rulings,31' have motivated the
formation of new comprehensive management plans that were not yet
complete.31 2 Because of these uncertainties, NMFS saw the southern
fisheries as not yet "ripe" for consultations.31 3
It is not clear from the language of the Biological Opinion when the
southern fisheries will be "ripe" for consultations. The Opinion states that
they "will be considered in more detail during consultation on associated
future federal actions."31 4  However, "associated future federal actions" are
not defined in the Biological Opinion.315  Pre-decisional memoranda are
equally unclear. In his letter addressing the concerns of Billy Frank Jr.,
Chairman of the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, NMFS Northwest
Regional Administrator William Stelle simply states "[b]ecause of [the
above] uncertainties, the southern fisheries are not considered as part of the
proposed action covered by this [Biological Opinion], but will be considered
in future section 7 consultations.
'
"
31 6
307 Id. Why this suggests that the fisheries should be excluded is unclear. Presumably it is because
the taking of listed species by Washington and Oregon fleets is mainly limited to species from those
jurisdictions. Therefore it is more exclusively an issue to be handled by the management plans of those
states. However, as discussed above, the Alaskan fisheries was subject to review precisely because of the
deferred management authority to that state.
308 Id.
309 North of Falcon is a process by which the Washington Department of Fisheries, Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife, NMFS, and the Treaty Tribes join to formulate the fishing plans to meet
all biological and other requirements.
':0 Stelle, supra note 296.
31 Section 4(d) of the ESA requires that when a species is listed as threatened, the Secretary shall
issue regulations to provide for the conservation ofthe species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
312 id.
313 Stelle, supra note 296. Larry Rutter's explanation for the decision to exclude the southern
fisheries is that "the bilateral agreement did not provide much specificity regarding the management of
southern U.S. fisheries because those fisheries involve few interceptions, in contrast to the Alaskan fishery.
That they were not considered in the BO stems from the fact that those fisheries would be reviewed in
another context, namely the detailed southern fishery management plans that would be developed and
implemented by the states and tribes." Rutter, supra note 95.
3:4 Biological Opinion, supra note 21, at 7.
315 See generally id.
316 Stelle, supra note 296. The foundation in the Diplomatic Notes for the redaction of the southern
fishery from the ESA review is unclear. Section 8 of the note from Acting Secretary of State Thomas
Pickering to Canadian Prime Minister Raymond Chretien calls for each government to take the necessary
steps to ensure compliance with its national laws. 1999 Agreement, supra note 15, Diplomatic Notes. The
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In the area the Biological Opinion did cover, the northern fishery,
NMFS ultimately concluded that the terms of the Agreement are not likely
to jeopardize any endangered salmon species.317 It is beyond the scope of
this article to analyze the accuracy of this Opinion, except to say that it is
consistent with ESA and NMFS regulations. The Opinion established an
environmental baseline, determined the effects of the action and took into
account cumulative effects, fulfilling the requirements of the ESA.3 18
NMFS included an incidental take statement permitting the take of
endangered or threatened salmon that is "incidental to and not intended as
part of the agency action."3'9  NMFS concluded that the amount of
incidental take of any one of the endangered or threatened evolutionarily
significant units ("ESUs") 320 of Pacific salmon would "vary from year to
year," be a "rare event" or would not be taken at all.32' One can only
estimate that these take levels of salmon, largely originating in the rivers and
streams of Washington and Oregon, would increase if the Washington and
Oregon fisheries were included in the analysis. In addition, NMFS included
some "Reasonable and Prudent Measures" and "Terms and Conditions" of
that essentially require the various management agencies involved follow the
terms of the agreement. 322 NMFS also included non-binding conservation
recommendations to federal agencies, 323 suggesting the agencies monitor the
conditions and that, at some point in the future, in some areas, they adopt
more restrictive harvest responses than are specified in the agreement.
324
According to NMFS, the southern fisheries are being accommodated
through procedures conducted after the Biological Opinion. Larry Rutter
notes also add "in particular, implementation of this Agreement by the United States Government shall be
contingent on a determination that the Agreement satisfies the legal requirements under the United States
Endangered Species Act." Id. This statement seemingly calls for review of the whole Agreement, not parts
of it. Similarly, the language of the NMFS regulations does not clearly support the decision by NMFS to
divide and ignore half of the agency action area. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. As discussed earlier, under
regulations adopted by NMFS, the initiation of consultation with NMFS is mandatory if the proposed
agency action may affect listed species or critical habitat. Id. § 402.14(a). The act provides no provision
for setting aside large parts of the agency action because it is complex or difficult to manage. See generally
50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
317 Biological Opinion, supra note 21, at 66.
318 Id. pts. III-IV.
I d. at 77.
320 ESU was a term developed by NMFS to describe sub-species of Salmon with distinct genetic
characteristics and endemic to certain areas. See id. at 1.
321 Id. at 78-79.
322 Id. at 80.
323 Id. at 81. This results in the interesting sentence: "NMFS believes the following conservation
recommendations are consistent with these (ESA) obligations, and therefore should be implemented by
NMFS." Id.
324 id.
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explained that "Section 7 consultations on the southern fisheries occurred as
soon as the applicable management plans were formulated, i.e., in advance
of the 2000 fishing season, and again in advance of the 2001 season (under
4(d)). 3 25 These plans should provide the necessary review that was not
included under the Biological Opinion.
326
VI. CONCLUSION
Given that the 1999 Agreement is a harvest-focused agreement, it
places significant importance on the sustainability of salmon. The flexible,
resource based management regimes consider the yearly strength of the
salmon runs before and during the harvest season. The (U.S.) $140 million
Endowment Funds provided a financial base to take on substantial
conservation initiatives. The renewed commitment to scientific cooperation,
combined with the provision to protect and restore salmon habitat, if nothing
else, provide strong language for the conservation of the salmon. The ESA
review by NMFS was complete for the section of the fishery it covered, and
subsequent measures appear to cover the additional areas in the Agreement.
While the Abundance Based Management Regimes and the two
Endowment Funds are critical elements of the 1999 Agreement, the success
of the negotiations lies in the Canadian compromise. In spite of a legitimate
claim to historical inequities of Pacific salmon harvest in favor of the United
States, the Canadian government chose to set aside malcontent and instead
embrace the agreement. The shift in Canadian negotiation posture reflected
a long-term understanding of resource management and a willingness to
pioneer new avenues for success. It was this change that broke the
seemingly intractable stalemate and provided the basis for a final agreement
balancing the needs of the treaty nations, their commercial fleets, and the
Pacific salmon.
325 Rutter, supra note 95.
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